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Symposium
TORT REFORM: WILL IT ADVANCE JUSTICE
IN THE CIVIL SYSTEM?
INTRODUCTION
RICHARD C. TURKINGTONt
T HE term "tort reform"' has now become firmly ensconced in
the national consciousness as a consequence of a media blitz
over the last few years. The media has spoken of it in conjunction
with discussion of the "insurance crisis" to such an extent that the
two have become inextricably associated in the minds of lay per-
sons, lawyers and legal scholars. In one sense, this is as it should
be, because tort reform refers to a species of legislation that states
have enacted to correct a perceived crisis in the availability of af-
fordable liability insurance for professionals, local governmental
entities, non-profit associations, selected manufacturers and ser-
vice providers. The specter of losses of important services to the
public because of the unavailability of liability insurance pro-
duced the prototype of this legislative species, the California
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). 2
The strategies which MIRCA and other tort reform legislation
generally adopt to solve the perceived crisis are to restrict signifi-
t Professor of Law, Villanova Law School, Villanova, PA. B.A., 1963, J.D.,
1966, Wayne State University; L.L.M., 1967, New York University.
1. Throughout this introduction and in the symposium the term tort reform
is employed to refer to legislation that restricts established common-law rights
of tort plaintiffs in tort actions to correct a perceived crisis in the availability of
liability insurance. Thik is the official designation given to such laws by the me-
dia, legal profession and tort scholars. See. e.g., Phillips, Future Implications of the
NAational Tort Reform Movement, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 277 (1987); Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and ,fodern 7ort Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1521, 1527 (1987); see also
White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Perspective, 32 VILL. L.
REV. 1265 (1987) (discussing special features of current tort reform movement
and contrasting it with prior movements).
2. See 1975 Cal. Stat. 3945 2d Ex. Sess. ch. 1.
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cantly the bundle of rights that have evolved under the common-
law tradition in tort actions brought by seriously injured persons.
Tort reform legislation, as exemplified by the malpractice
prototype, characteristically entails: (1) pretrial screening panels;
(2) caps or other restrictions on non-economic and punitive dam-
ages;3 (3) regulation of attorneys' fees; (4) alternatives to lump-
sum payment of damage judgments such as periodic payments;
(5) abolition or restriction of the collateral source rule;4 (6) selec-
tive restriction on statutes of limitations and alterations of related
concepts such as the discovery rule 5 and (7) restriction on joint
3. The California statue set a cap of $250,000 on "non-economic" damages
recoverable from health care providers in actions based on professional negli-
gence. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1987). Caps in tort reform legisla-
tion typically limit the amount of recovery for physical and emotional pain and
suffering, an element of compensatory damages historically available in negli-
gence actions. At this time, tort reform legislation, however, does not typically
place caps on the other feature of compensatory damages, out of pocket loss for
lost wages or medical expenses (special damages). Damage caps compromise
the common-law tort principle that innocent injured plaintiffs have a right to
recover damages that fully compensate them for all cognizable tort injuries that
the wrongful tortfeasor has caused. Caps that are set at high amounts effectively
impact only on the seriously or permanently injured tort plaintiff. Under com-
pensatory damage concepts, past and future physical and emotional distress are
recoverable. Large damage judgments, therefore, generally involve seriously or
permanently injured plaintiffs.
4. The collateral source rule provides that payment for some of the costs of
the accident by a source other than the defendant do not reduce the damage
award against the defendant. This common-law rule is generally criticized as
granting a windfall to the plaintiff. In some instances this may occur. However,
in many and perhaps most cases, because of subrogation rights, the collateral
source rule simply shifts the loss of these payments from the plaintiff's insurer
who has paid for costs such as medical expenses to the defendant's insurer.
Abolishing the collateral source rule, therefore, may result in reducing costs to
the healthcare practictioner's insurer, but not with reduction of overall insur-
ance costs. It also may produce the anomalous result of requiring the innocent
plaintiff's insurance company to pay more than the insurer of the healthcare
practitioner who was at fault. See generally Jenkins & Schweinfurth, California 's
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 829 (1979); A.B.A. Report of the American Bar Association Action Commission to
Improve the Tort Liability System Appendix B-I (1987).
5. The New Hampshire statute illustrates examples of selective changes in
the statute of limitations and abolition of the discovery rule. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507-C (Supp. 1983). Section 507-C:4 changes the existing six year stat-
ute of limitations to two years for medical injury actions; abolishes the discovery
rule, except in cases where a foreign object is left in the plaintiff's body, and
requires minors under eight years of age to bring the action by their tenth birth-
day. The New Hampshire Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional.
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980). For a further discussion,
see Turkington, Constitutional Limitations on Tort Reform: Have the State Courts
Placed Insurmountable Obstacles in the Path of Legislative Responses to the Perceived Liabil-
ity Insurance Crisis?, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1299 (1987). Many states have also enacted
statutes of repose in products liability actions and in negligence actions against
contractors or architects. These statutes limit suits from the time of an activity,
1212 [Vol. 32: p. 1211
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and several tort liability. 6 Such legislation is based upon a set of
assumptions. One is that increases in insurance premiums have
created a "crisis" in the availability of affordable liability insur-
ance. Another is that there is a significant relationship between
substantive tort law and the tort litigation process and the insur-
ance industry's decisions on the availability and price of liability
insurance. A related assumption is that restricting these and
other features of the tort liability system that have evolved under
the common-law tradition will sufficiently reduce insurance pre-
miums to make reasonably priced insurance more available.7
There has been a spirited and contentious debate in numer-
ous forums as to whether these assumptions are correct. The
most ardent opponents of tort reform, such as the American Trial
Lawyers Association 8 and Ralph Nader, charge that tort reform is
such as sale or construction, and not from the time of the tort injury. Typically,
statutes of limitations begin to toll from the time of the injury. For a further
discussion, see Turkington, supra, at 1330-31.
6. Under twentieth century notions of joint and several tort liability, in-
dependent tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable if their conduct concurs to
produce a single indivisible injury to the plaintiff. This is a change from the
early common law which required some form of concerted action or joint liabil-
ity based upon a respondeat superior relationship. While the plaintiff gets a
judgment for the whole amount of injuries recoverable against each of the
tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable, the plaintiff may not recover
more than the full amount of damages. A tortfeasor who has paid an excessive
amount of the damages may seek contribution from the other tortfeasors.
Consequently, the concept of joint and several tort liability primarily func-
tions to shift the risk of loss for an insolvent tortfeasor from the plaintiff to the
other liable defendants. Tort reform legislation typically reverts to the early
common-law rule and limits the doctrine to concerted action or wanton or will-
ful misconduct. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (Supp. 1988) (codifying HB
2024). Compare McKay, Rethinking the Tort Liability System: A Report fiom the ABA
Action Commission, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1219 (1987). See also Wade, An Evaluation of
the "Insurance Crisis" and Existing Tort Law, 24 Hous. L. REv. 81, 86 (1987) (ques-
tioning the sensibility and fairness of proposals to "reform" joint and several
tort liability law).
7. The statement of purpose for the Kansas tort reform legislation provides
a good example:
Substantial increases in costs of professional liability insurance for
health care providers have created a crisis of availability and af-
fordability. This situation poses a serious threat to the continued avail-
ability and quality of health care in Kansas. In the interest of the public
health and welfare, new measures are required to assure that affordable
professional liability insurance will be available to Kansas health care
providers, to assure that injured parties receive adequate compensation
for their injuries and to maintain the quality of health care in Kansas.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3405 (Supp. 1987).
8. The American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) participated in the
symposium held on February 21, 1987 that resulted in this law review publica-
tion. ATLA did not submit an article for this publication. Alan Parker, the
ATLA speaker at the symposium, expressed some of the views that are repre-
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an "unprincipled public relations scam"' which the insurance in-
dustry engineered to rebound from losses it suffered from cyclical
downturns in interest rates. Seizing an opportunity to reduce ul-
timate liability by changing tort law, the industry withdrew cover-
age, dramatically increased premiums and joined with corporate
defense interests in waging a media and lobbying campaign to
permanently alter tort rights through legislation.' 0 Equally avid
supporters of tort reform lay the responsibility for spiraling insur-
ance costs and the withdrawal of coverage primarily on tort law.
They claim that expanded concepts of liability, an explosion in
litigation and the granting of large damage awards has produced
unpredictability and unmanageable pay outs that caused a bona
fide insurance crisis." Both sides have spent large amounts of
money in promoting their views in the media. 12 Evidence on the
role of investment cycles and tort law expansion and damage
judgments on the undisputed fact of spiraling increases in insur-
ance premiums is in conflict.l 3 Perhaps the clearest inference that
sented in this summary of anti-tort reform sentiment. ATLA's strong opposition
to tort reform is well known.
9. Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Victims' Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 15,
18 (1987).
10. Farrel & Glaberson, The Explosion in Liability Lawsuits Is Nothing But a
Myth, Bus. WK. Apr. 21, 1986, at 24; see Nader, supra note 9, at 18; The Manufac-
tured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REPS. 544 (Aug. 1986). California, New York and six
other states have recently filed antitrust suits against numerous insurance com-
panies and the insurance trade association contending that they engaged in a
conspiracy and illegal boycott that was a major cause of the insurance crisis in
the areas of environmental law and governmental tort liability. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1988, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
11. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, AN UPDATE ON THE
LIABILITY CRISIS 32-59 (1987); DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY
WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CUR-
RENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986) [hereinafter
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT]; INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE LAWSUIT
CRISIS (1986).
12. SeeJ. COM. I (Mar. 19, 1986) (insurance industry sponsored six million
dollar national media campaign demonstrating lawsuit explosion and crisis);
Schulte, Availability, Affordability, and Accountability: Regulatory Reform of Insurance,
14 FLA. ST. L. REV. 557, 559 & n.14 (1986) (newspaper reports had indicated
that Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers had spent $200,000 on advertisement in
Florida laying crisis at doorstep of unnecessary premium increases by insurance
industry).
13. See DEP'T oFJUSTICE, REPORT, supra note 11 (relying on statistical analy-
sis of tort actions in diversity suits in federal courts to support claims of litiga-
tion and jury verdict explosion). Compare NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF AVAILABLE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TREND DATA IN
STATE TRIAL COURTS FOR 1978, 1981 and 1984 (1986) (data based upon state
court suits does not support litigation explosion); BELLOTri, ANALYSIS OF TIlE
CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE (1986) (data does not support claim of litigation "explosion");
1214 [Vol. 32: p. 1211
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one can draw from the evidence presented in the public debate is
that a host of factors including those relating to investment cycles
and the tort liability system and external social phenomena con-
tribute to the decisions on the price and availability of liability
insurance. A substantial connection between tort reform and
available and affordable liability insurance, therefore may not be
demonstrable.
The subject of this symposium: Tort Reform: Will It Ad-
vance Justice in the Civil System, is addressed from a number of
persepectives by the participants.
Professor McKay's perspective is as chairman of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Action Committee on Tort Liability. He re-
views the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the
commission, their deliberative process, and the debate that
culminated in the consensus that the final report expresses. The
American Bar Association's position as reflected in the McKay ar-
ticle and the Commission Report is a moderate one that vindi-
cates the basics features of the American tort liability system.' 4
Dr. Mooney's article examines the relationship between the
decisions of the insurance industry and the tort liability system
from.the perspective of the insurance industry. He also responds
to the charge that the insurance industry is responsible for the
insurance liability crisis, either through poor judgments or fraud
and collusion to produce changes in tort law or both. He ac-
knowledges that investments cycles and external factors such as
media focus on social phenomena, such as child abuse, have con-
tributed to rising insurance costs. He finds, however, that the
core of the problem lies with the movement in tort law away from
a fault-based system toward enterprise liability and granting pri-
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 4 (1983) and McKay, supra note 6 with Mooney, The Liability Crisis-A Perspec-
tive, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1235 (1987).
Some studies have rejected a single cause view and suggested that the com-
bination of investment cycles and expansion of costs in the civil justice system
are responsible for the problem. See A.B.A., Report of the American Bar Association
Action Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System 4 (1987); INSURING OUR Fu-
TURE: REPORT OF THE (NEW YORK) GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMISSION ON LIABIL-
ITY INSURANCE, Vol. I, (1986). Professor Priest suggests that neither of these two
causal theories, individually or in tandem adequately explain the insurance cri-
sis. Priest argues that the expansion of enterprise liability and shift to third-
party corporate insurance coverage is the primary evil. Priest, supra note 1, at
1524; see generally Phillips, supra note 1 (splendid summary of data and arguments
supporting various positions on tort reform and causes of "crisis").
14. See McKay, supra note 6.
1987] 1215
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macy to the goal of compensation. He argues that if this move-
ment continues, insurance crises are inevitable, and ultimately
may require dramatic transformation of the liability system to the
workers compensation model of no-fault and limited recovery for
damages. 15
Professor White looks at the current phenomenon of tort re-
form from a historical perspective of other significant reforms in
the law of torts. He concludes that reforms, such as workers'
compensation and strict liability for defective products, reflected
deep commitments in our culture and our system of torts to the
concept of moral accountability for injury. He distinguishes cur-
rent tort reform as reflecting arguments that seek to deflect rather
than to facilitate the principle of moral accountability. 16
Mooney and White address a basic tension in the dialogue
about tort reform. This tension involves policies that will pro-
mote a cost efficient system of compensation and insurance and
principles of justice that are reflected in long standing traditions
of accountability and reparation. The receptiveness that state leg-
islatures have accorded tort reform suggests that at this time the
national mood is to give primacy to the cost efficiency policies and
assumptions upon which tort reform legislation is based irrespec-
tive of what the best evidence may demonstrate.
These conflicting notions of cost efficiency and justice face
off in those states where constitutional challenges to tort reform
have been successful. My article discusses the surprising phe-
nomena of many state courts invalidating portions or all of some
tort reform legislation on state constitutional grounds. Limita-
tions that strike at the core of the common-law tradition, such as
caps on compensatory damages, are most vulnerable to judicial
activism in the state courts. These decisions constitute judicial
recognition of traditions of political morality in those states that
reflect the deep seated cultural committment to principles of ac-
countability for injury that Professor White speaks of. These
courts require, at the least, that there be a demonstration of effi-
ciency, in the sense of making liability insurance cheaper and
more available, before the courts will subordinate the common-
law tradition of full compensatory damages for injury.17
The formal bonding of insurance and substantive tort law is
one of the peculiar and historically significant features of the cur-
15. See Mooney, supra note 13.
16. See White, supra note 1.
17. See Turkington, supra note 5.
1216 [Vol. 32: p. 1211
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rent tort reform movement. The idea for this symposium was
spawned in the spring of 1986 at the height of publicity about the
liability insurance crisis and tort reform.' In these last two years
much has transpired in our legal system about tort reform.
Significant adjustments in rates as well as the withdrawal
from some markets have produced a dramatic recovery for the
insurance industry and somewhat less of a crisis in the availability
of insurance.' 9 Few seriously suppose that this is more than a
temporary arrangement. Two things have occurred that are of
more permanent significance. Tort reform legislation has spread
swiftly and state courts have increasingly constitutionalized some
features of tort reform. The phenomenon of legislatively restrict-
ing personal injury tort actions in order to control cost and make
insurance both available and affordable has spread from its initial
focus on medical malpractice to personal injury claims in tort
generally. The pace of legislation and alteration of venerable tra-
ditions in tort law has been phenomenal. In 1987, thirty-six states
reclaimed through legislation a form of governmental immunity;
several states reestablished charitable immunity. Nearly a major-
ity of states have enacted changes in joint and several tort liability;
most states have enacted or proposed changes in the collateral
source rule and regulation of attorneys fees, damage caps and pu-
nitive damages. State legislatures are now considering thousands
of bills that would reform the civil justice system and regulate the
insurance industy as well. 20 If the pace of legislative enactment of
tort reform continues, in a short period of time venerable con-
cepts of tort law such as punitive damages, the collateral source
rule and the principle that a wrongful tortfeasor is responsible for
all cognizable tort injuries caused to an innocent plaintiff might
become dinosaurs of our legal system.
18. See Sorry, Your Policy is Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 18.
19. For a discussion of the escalation of rates and current fiscal health of
insurance industry, see McKay, supra note 6, at 1219-2 1; Mooney, supra note 13,
at 1241-51.
20. The summary of proposed and enacted tort reform legislation pub-
lished by the National Conference of State Legislatures, in 1986 and 1987, indi-
cates that twenty-four states altered joint and several tort liability; thirteen states
capped noneconomic damages; fifteen states restricted punitive damages and
eighteen states restricted or abolished the collateral source rule. A large
number of bills have been proposed both restricting rights in the civil law system
and regulating insurance. Twenty-two states enacted insurance regulation in
1987. The conference of state legislatures reports 13,000 bills proposed in
1987; this is up from 10,000 in 1986. See NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
1987 SUMMARY ON LIABILITY INSURANCE (1987); NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLA-
TURES, 1986 STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTION: LIABILITY INSURANCE (1986).
1987] 1217
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This recent history suggests that the cycle of a perceived cri-
sis in the availability of insurance and state legislative reactions in
restricting the scope of traditional tort rights will be a permanent
feature of our legal system, at least until the unlikely occurrence
of federal preemption of the tort reparation system. In a very
short period of time, tort reform has broken away from its origins
in medical malpractice to become a permanent and important fea-
ture of personal injury law.
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